Regardless of whether Kisor changed principles of deference under Auer, lower courts appear less inclined to find ambiguity in agency regulations after the Kisor decision; and when they do, “unfair surprise” continues to be the most common factor weighing against deference to an agency’s interpretation.
Continue Reading Lower Courts Grappling with Deference Principles Following Kisor
At least some courts applying the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kisor v. Wilkie are rejecting agency regulatory interpretations that create “unfair surprise” for regulated parties.
Continue Reading No Unfair Surprises Under Kisor
According to the dictionary, a phrase is “ambiguous” if it has more than one meaning.
Chevron[1] is frequently cited for the proposition that the presence of “ambiguity” gives an agency the authority to interpret the statute to eliminate the ambiguity. A better view of Chevron is that only the Courts may resolve statutory ambiguity through interpretation. When faced with statutory terms that may be given more than one meaning, courts must determine, applying canons of statutory construction, what Congress has resolved, what Congress has given the Agency discretion to resolve, and what ascertainable standards have been established by Congress to govern the exercise of discretion by the Agency. In other words, Chevron contemplates that the Court declare what the law requires, including the scope of discretion afforded an agency to make policy choices that give content to broad statutory terms.
Continue Reading The Time Has Come to Overrule Auer